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Abstract 
The tragic deaths of over 300 people off the coast of Lampedusa in 
2013 and many other incidents involving migrants from Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) crossing the Mediterranean in order 
to seek refuge in Europe has led to a European Union (EU) level 
debate on asylum policies and how to deal with irregular 
migration. However, no concrete policy has been agreed since the 
tragic events at Lampedusa in 2013 and continuous crossings that 
have resulted in many more deaths.  
 
This background brief provides an overview of the existing EU 
policies on asylum seekers and in addressing irregular migration 
and some of the actions which the relevant Member States take 
when confronted with continuous flows of irregular migrants. This 
brief concludes that the EU should delink the rescue of irregular 
migrants from security concerns, provide a legal basis which offers 
protection to irregular migrants, and create a transparent working 
environment in which member states are better able to support 
each other when dealing with such events. 
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EU Policies on Mixed Migration 





In October 2013, a boat with around 500 migrants 
sank off the coast of Lampedusa. More than 300 
people died, which triggered a strong call for 
action from European leaders and the public to 
prevent this tragedy from happening again. This 
event and many other incidents involving migrants 
from Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
crossing the Mediterranean in order to seek refuge 
in Europe has led to a debate on an EU level 
regarding asylum policies and how to deal with 
irregular migration. However, while debates 
continued, no concrete policy was agreed upon, 
and one year later, in September 2014, another 
500 migrants drowned in their attempt to cross 
the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
This background brief gives an overview of existing 
EU policies on asylum seekers and in addressing 
irregular migration and some of the actions which 
the relevant Member States take when confronted 
with continuous flows of irregular migrants. 
 
Please note that this paper uses the term 
“irregular migration” rather than “illegal 
migration” throughout. Irregular movement by sea 
is commonly understood to refer to travel 
involving unauthorized departure or arrival by sea. 
Documents by the EU use the term “irregular” and 
“illegal”. However, since the term “illegal” is 
considered to have a negative connotation, NGOs 
and other stakeholders in this field prefer the term 
“irregular”. 
 
In order to understand the issues which arise in 
the Mediterranean, one has to look at the 
numbers and scope of irregular migration. Arrivals 
                                                        
1 Ms Julia Gour is an Associate Fellow of the European Union 
Centre in Singapore. The views and opinions expressed in this 
article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
official policy or position of the European Union. 
by sea into the EU have increased significantly in 
2014: 75,000 people arrived in Spain, Greece, Italy 
and Malta in the first half of 2014, whereas 60,000 
migrants and refugees arrived in the whole of 2013. 
Italy received the highest number with 64,000 in 
the first half of 2014. The Central Mediterranean 
route had the largest percentage of all detections 
of irregular crossings of EU external border, 
namely 40,304 in 2013 which amounted to 38 per 
cent of the total detections. Most boats departed 
from Libya and Egypt. The main nationalities of the 
refugees and migrants entering the EU through 
this route have been Eritrean, Syrians and 
Somalians (Italian Council for Refugees, 2014). This 
route is the deadliest in the world. The Strait of 
Sicily is a small, easily navigable area, between 
Tunis and Lampedusa, covered through the Search 
and Rescue Zones of Malta, Italy, Tunisia and Libya. 
This stretch of the Mediterranean is anything but a 
deserted area with a high number of commercial 
fleets, and military and maritime surveillance 
vessels. For many migrant boats, however, it has 
become a deadly trap. The number of migrants 
who have died at the sea frontiers of the EU is high 
but unknown, as are the identities of many (Grant 
2011). The International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) estimates that from 1988 to 2013 
about 15,000 people died, trying to cross the 
southern Mediterranean border through irregular 
means (International Organisation for Migration, 
2014:92). Figures which are available should be 
treated with caution, because estimates tend to be 
based on media reports, on detection levels, or on 
the accounts of survivors of a particular incident. 
No precise statistical accounting is possible and 
actual figures may be higher. 
 
Currently, Italy hosts over 108,000 migrants who 
arrived by sea, far more than any country in the 
region. Greece has nearly 15,000, while some 
1,800 are in Spain and around 300 in Malta (Africa 
Research Bulletin 2014). The two most obvious 
reasons for migration from Africa are the 
socioeconomic gap between Africa and Europe and 
conflicts in several African countries. However, the 
reasons for irregular migration are actually quite 
complex. Failing states, authoritarian regimes, and 
war-torn regions have all contributed to the 
outflows of people from the Middle East and Africa 
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to Europe (Demmelhuber 2011). Persons entering 
the EU in an irregular manner are not a 
homogenous group with transit migrants, labour 
migrants, and refugees being the most relevant 
sub-groups (ibid.). Since the EU is one open area of 
free movement, some countries control sections of 
the EU’s external borders on behalf of others. 
 
When discussing irregular migration one cannot 
exclude the issues of rising sentiments against 
immigrants and the rise of the far-right/anti-
immigration parties. These developments are 
fuelled by the Euro zone crisis and the raft of 
austerity measures that came into place to address 
the debt crisis. High unemployment rates, a fall in 
living standards and the fear of immigrants and 
asylum seekers have contributed to many voters 
shifting their support to anti-immigrant, far-right 
and fringe parties in many EU Member States. This 
has become obvious both at a national level and at 
the EU level, reflected in the latest European 
elections in May 2014. From the Sweden 
Democrats to the True Finns, from Marie Le Pen’s 
National Front in France to Golden Dawn in Greece, 
anti-immigrants sentiments have been whipped up 
by these parties capitalising on the insecurities felt 
by the electorate. 
 
On the question of how the EU should approach 
this problem of irregular migration in the 
Mediterranean, there is considerable discord, 
dividing those who believe far more needs to be 
done to prioritise the saving of lives, from those 
who fear any shift in emphasis away from border 
enforcement will only encourage people trafficking 
and a steady flow of irregular migrants into 
European shore. Instead of facilitating legal ways 
for refugees to travel safely to Europe, the EU 
increasingly expects its neighbours in the Middle 
East and North Africa to prevent people from 
reaching its borders, leaving many in a state of 
limbo. While the EU has the right to control its 
borders, this author believes that the security 
imperatives should not override the human rights 
commitments which are founding principles of the 
EU. Furthermore, all EU Member States are 
committed to certain international conventions. 
The most important ones in the refugee and 
asylum context being the Human Rights 
Convention of the United Nations (UN), and 
especially the 1951 Geneva Convention on 
Refugees and its 1967 New York Protocol. Article 1 
of the Convention defines a refugee as someone 
who is outside her/his country of habitual 
residence and who has left this country due to a 
fear of persecution (Hatton 2009). Article 33 
provides that a person cannot be forcibly returned 
to a territory where he or she may be at risk of 
persecution; this is called the non-refoulement 
principle (ibid.). 
 
Access to the EU's Territory 
 
Primarily because of the terrorist attacks on the 
USA in 2001, in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 
2005, measures to prevent irregular migration 
have become stricter. This has worsened the 
situation for genuine asylum seekers. The EU 
Member States adopted security measures, which 
led to an increasingly restrictive interpretation of 
the right to access the asylum system and state 
territory of the EU (Peers & Rogers 2006). A 
corollary of restricting legal migration and 
tightening access to Europe is that irregular 
migration has increased significantly. For instance, 
the imposition of visa requirements on nationals of 
refugee-producing countries puts asylum-seekers 
in the situation of having to resort to irregular 
forms of migration to enter the EU first and seek 
protection. The European Council on Refugees and 
Exiles (ECRE) highlights also that the only way for 
people fleeing for their lives to attempt to come to 
Europe is through the use of organised crime 
groups. This is further underlined by the 
requirement for Airport Transit Visas, which are 
used to prevent asylum applications at airports 
from persons in transit towards further 
destinations. However, it also should be borne in 
mind that the EU has to keep a balance: while 
guaranteeing respect for fundamental freedoms 
and rights, it has to take a joint approach to cross-
border problems such as irregular migration, 
trafficking in and smuggling of human beings, 
terrorism and organised crime, as well as the 
prevention thereof. 
 
On the basis of the Stockholm Programme (2009-
2014), Strategic Guidelines for Legislative and 
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Operational Planning in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice have been defined in June 
2014 during the European Council meeting. While 
assuring the EU’s commitment in the areas of 
migration, asylum and border management, there 
is no mention of any further concrete initiatives in 
these fields to address the challenges that arise 
due to the growing number of conflict areas all 
over the world. Furthermore, the Council has no 
answers to the recurring requests for EU solidarity 
by Italy which is currently facing unprecedented 
high migration pressure at its sea borders (Italian 
Council for Refugees 2014). 
 
According to Basaran (2014: 366) the problem is 
not geography or a lack of capacities, as often 
described in EU debates, but disagreements over 
the sanctioning of rescue. In 2011, the unpopular 
case of a “left-to-die boat” occurred - the boat  
“returned” after fourteen days adrift in the Strait 
of Sicily with only eleven of seventy-two 
passengers surviving the ordeal. Testimonies of 
survivors confirm encounters with military 
helicopters, ships and fishing vessels, but nobody 
came to their rescue. No one bothered even to 
inform the maritime authorities. This case that 
came into light was not a unique case. There 
seems to be a tendency to turn away from boats 
with irregular migrants, even if the boat is in real 
distress, in order to avoid costly investigations, 
detention or possible prosecution (see chapter 
“The Principle of Non-Refoulement and Push-
Backs”). This is contrary to the principle of non-
refoulement which all EU Member States are 
committed to. The signatories are obliged to check 
if an irregular migrant is in need of international 
protection. Furthermore, a person cannot be 
repatriated to a country in which she/he might 
face persecution. The so called push-backs 
adopted by the EU are a violation of the principle 
non-refoulement; it is also a violation of the 
human rights of migrants sent back to the country 
from which they started their journey without an 
assessment of their protection needs. Despite the 
fact that there is a legal duty to provide assistance 
at sea, over the last decades an increasing number 
of laws, regulations and practices on national, 
regional and international levels have effectively 
discouraged rescue at sea (ibid.). 
Task Force Mediterranean 
 
As already mentioned, the tragic event at the Strait 
of Sicily in October 2013 has led to a reinvigoration 
of debates on saving lives at sea. A few weeks after 
this incident, the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the European Council 
released statements on the need to prevent these 
tragedies from happening again. The Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) Council proposed the set-up of 
the Task Force Mediterranean to identify solutions 
to avoid such tragedies.  Subsequently, there were 
two meetings, on 24 October 2013 and 20 
November 2013, with all Member States, the 
European External Action Service and various EU 
Agencies, including the European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO), European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union (Frontex), Europol, European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA).  
 
The meetings resulted in a Communication 
identifying five areas of action. The first action 
point is to look into cooperation with third 
countries to strengthen capacities in managing 
mixed migration flows, for example through 
Mobility Partnerships agreement. The second 
action point is on regional protection, resettlement 
and reinforced legal avenues to Europe. Existing 
Regional Protection Programmes should be 
strengthened and reinforced and new ones 
established. Another action proposed in this area is 
the expansion of resettlement programmes. The 
third action point which addresses the fight against 
trafficking, smuggling and organised crime, should 
mainly be supported through EUROPOL and inter-
agency cooperation. Fourthly, Frontex and inter-
agency cooperation should assist in border 
surveillance, in order to enhance the protection 
and saving of the lives of migrants in the 
Mediterranean. And the last action point is aimed 
at the assistance and solidarity with EU Member 
States dealing with high migration pressure, for 
instance through funding and assistance by EASO 
(European Asylum Support Office) and Frontex 
(European Commission 2013:  2f). 
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The Communication underlines three co-
supportive agendas for addressing the issue of 
tackling tragedies at sea: a Prevention agenda, a 
Security agenda and a Rescue agenda. The 
prevention agenda seeks to prevent migrants from 
reaching the coast. Its aim is to provide incentives 
to migrants to use legal routes, and at the same 
time to deter migrants from boarding vessels 
operated by human smugglers in the first place, 
and attempting to come to Europe through 
irregular means. This agenda is addressed primarily 
through cooperation with third countries, 
alternative legal migration routes and by 
deterrence through border surveillance. The 
security agenda is focused on the fight against 
smuggling, trafficking and organised crime and to 
increase border surveillance. However, the rescue 
agenda of the Communication, focusing on saving 
lives at seas is hardly discussed. No specific area is 
dedicated to rescue at sea. The word “rescue” 
appears only in 2 of the 38 action points (points 
1.9 and 3.8). The Communication states that in 
order to increase operational and coordination 
capacities for rescue missions, there is a need to 
strengthen Frontex, complemented by 
technological fortification through EUROSUR 
(European Asylum Support Office 2014 & see 
chapter “Frontex and EUROSUR”). This indicates 
that there is a strong tendency to prevent people 
from reaching Europe in an irregular manner. It has 
to be highlighted that many of the proposals 
outlined in the Task Force Mediterranean continue 
with current policies of prevention, security and 
rescue, increasing operational capacities of Frontex 
and the Member States, supplemented by border 
surveillance technologies. 
 
The following paragraphs outline the main policies 
and approaches of the areas addressed by the Task 
Force Mediterranean. 
 
Frontex and EUROSUR 
 
In 2004, the European Border Management 
Agency, Frontex, was founded by the EU. It is a 
“European attempt to implement the EU's 
'integrated border management system' in terms 
of its external dimension” (Demmelhuber, 2011: 
817). Frontex coordinates joint operations among 
EU Member States, liaises with non-EU countries 
to prevent irregular migration to the EU (see 
chapter “Cooperation with Third Countries”) and 
focuses on inter-agency cooperation. Frontex aims 
at strengthening the coordination and cooperation 
between Member States in their border 
management, in the training of national border 
guards and joint return operations, and carrying 
out intelligence services with regard to new 
migration routes and human traffickers’ networks. 
 
Detections of irregular border crossing along the 
EU’s external borders increased by 48 per cent in 
2013 against the 2012 figure — from 72,500 to 110, 
000 approximately. While the annual increase is 
significant, it was lower than the 141,000 reported 
during 2011 because of the ‘Arab Spring’ (Frontex 
2014: 54). Since its founding in 2004, Frontex has 
established itself as the key coordination body in 
the Mediterranean and has coordinated close to 
fifty sea operations. During this period its budget 
has increased exponentially from 6 million Euros in 
2004 to 94 million Euros in 2013 (Basaran 2014: 
371). 
 
Frontex claims that improved maritime border 
cooperation has had measurable results in 
reducing people smuggling and preventing the loss 
of lives at sea. However, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has criticized 
state policies which led to asylum seekers coming 
via the sea being ‘interdicted, intercepted, turned 
around, ignored by passing ships, shot at, or 
denied landing’ (Grant 2011: 141). Other reports 
indicate that on various missions on intercepted 
boats Frontex staff failed to check if there were 
people falling under the non-refoulement rule of 
the UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (1951; Protocol 1967 & 
Demmelhuber 2011). 
 
Another point of criticism is the lack of 
transparency on various levels. This is an issue in 
regard to pre-operational risk analysis and the 
evaluation reports on various missions, which are 
not made accessible to the public. There is also a 
low degree of transparency when it comes to 
Frontex’ reports to the European Parliament. 
Although the European Parliament was involved in 
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setting up the agency, it only receives information 
relating to Frontex’s finances but not on 
operational matters. There is no institutionalised 
mechanism for Parliament’s oversight of the 
operational activities of Frontex (Ifantis 2012:.43). 
 
In order to strengthen Frontex's operations, the 
European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) 
was founded. The EUROSUR System came (partly) 
into force in December 2013. It is a surveillance 
and data-sharing system which uses satellites and 
drones to monitor the high seas and the North 
African coast. “EUROSUR is a multipurpose system 
to detect and prevent cross-border crime (…), as 
well as to contribute to saving migrants' lives at 
the external borders of the Schengen area” 
(European Commission, 2013: 1). It follows an 
inter-agency approach and cooperates for example 
with the European Maritime Safety Agency and the 
EU Satellite Centre (European Commission 2013). 
Moreover, all national authorities (e.g. border 
guard, police, navy, coast guard) are required to 
cooperate and coordinate via national 
coordination centres and Frontex (Italian Council 
for Refugees, 2014: 34). The estimated costs for 
EUROSUR amount to 244 million Euros (2014-
2020). The costs are fully covered by existing EU 
programmes under the current and next multi-
annual financial framework of the EU (European 
Commission 2013). Although European 
policymakers claim that the technology will make a 
contribution to saving migrant lives on the sea, 
sceptics say that EUROSUR is still primarily focused 
on preventing migrants reaching Europe. There is a 
need to re-prioritise and to put humanitarian 
concerns at the forefront of EUROSUR's operations 
(Shenker 2013). 
 
Another important development is the 
implementation of the External Sea Border 
Surveillance Regulation, in May 2014. It provides 
the legal framework for activities of sea 
surveillance, in particular on disembarkation, 
search and rescue operations and provisions 
related to the respect of fundamental human 
rights and the principle of non-refoulement (Italian 
Council for Refugees 2014: 35). 
 
 
Operation “Mare Nostrum” 
 
The “Mare Nostrum” project was an Italian military 
and humanitarian mission which was launched by 
the Italian Ministry of Defence in October 2013. It 
was created in the aftermath of the Lampedusa 
tragedy which left over 300 migrants dead and was 
operating in the Channel of Sicily. Its aim was to 
strengthen surveillance on the high seas and 
search and rescue activities as well as to identify 
smugglers and traffickers (Italian Council for 
Refugees 2014: 105). The operation had cost over 
9 million Euros a month and involved about 920 
officers from the Navy, Custom police, Army, Air 
Force, Coast Guards, and other stakeholders 
working in the field of migration. A number of 
Navy vessels and helicopters with infrared 
equipment were deployed for the Operation 
(Asylum Information Database, 2014: 46). No other 
EU Member State except Slovenia had participated 
in this operation to support the Italian efforts. 
However “Mare Nostrum” did receive about 30 
million Euros of funding from the European 
Commission after the Lampedusa tragedy (Nelsen 
2014). 
 
From January 2014 to October 2014 142,085 
persons have been rescued under the “Mare 
Nostrum” operation (Italian Council for Refugees 
2014: 105). The operation had a broad support by 
the public and political opinion in Europe. 
Nevertheless, it was not integrated into the EU 
framework, despite former Commissioner 
Malmström's and the Italian Government's call to 
integrate the operation. This reveals the security 
centred approach of the EU and a lack of solidarity. 
“The Council has practically ignored the recurring 
requests for EU solidarity by Italy currently facing 
unprecedented high migration pressure at its sea 
borders” (ibid. p.30). The operation represents a 
cultural shift with respect to the push-back policy 
adopted in 2009 by the Italian authorities (see 
chapter “Cooperation with Third Countries) and 
which was condemned by the European Court of 
Human Rights in the Hirsi decision: a large number 
of Eritreans and Somalis fleeing Libya were 
returned to Libya without any examination of their 
protection needs. It was found that this was a clear 
violation of the principle of non-refoulement.  
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However, due to the lack of support by the EU and 
its Member States and the launch of the joint 
Frontex operation “Triton”, Italy ended “Mare 
Nostrum” at the end of October 2014. The absence 
of practical support to Italy from other EU Member 
States, except for Slovenia and the unheard call to 
step up financial contributions, led to the Italian 
government's decision to discontinue Mare 
Nostrum. 
 
While Mare Nostrum operated in international 
waters, “Triton” which begun its operation on 1st 
November 2014, is more limited since it is only 
active within 30 miles off the Italian coast. The 
operation has a budget of 2.9 million Euros per 
month, a third of the “Mare Nostrum” operation. 
Frontex plans a monthly deployment of two ocean 
patrol vessels, two coastal patrol boats, two 
aircrafts and a helicopter. In order to support the 
Italian authorities in collecting information on the 
people-smuggling networks operating in Libya and 
other countries, Frontex will also deploy 5 
debriefing teams to Italy (Frontex 2014). However, 
there has been manifold criticism by NGOs, UN 
human rights groups as well as commercial 
shipping industry regarding “Triton” since its 
primary focus is on border control. The 
International Chamber of Shipping states that “it 
will clearly be much more difficult for merchant 
ships to save lives at sea without the adequate 
provision of search and rescue services by EU 
Member States. Moreover, whenever a ship 
performs its legal and humanitarian obligations, it 
will continue to be incumbent on EU Member 
States to ensure that those who are rescued can 
be readily disembarked at the next port of call, 
even when they may lack documentation” (Quoted 
in: ECRE 2014). 
 
UNHCR and the European Council on Refugees and 
Exiles (ECRE) have also repeatedly expressed their 
objection over the ending of “Mare Nostrum” 
without an adequate European rescue initiative to 
replace it. The Italian Council for Refugees has 
raised its concerns too: “We agree that rescue at 
sea in the channel of Sicily should be considered a 
European responsibility and the Italian efforts 
under the ‘Mare Nostrum’ operation should be 
supported by other Member States and the 
European Commission. For the moment, the 
‘Frontex plus’ (now ”Triton”) plan does not appear 
to go into this direction as its predominant aim is 
strengthening border control and surveillance” 
(quoted in: ibid.). 
 
However, there were also criticisms from another 
direction: The UK Foreign Office announced 
beginning of November 2014 that they will not 
support or participate in any future search and 
rescue operations to prevent migrants and 
refugees drowning in the Mediterranean, claiming 
that such operations encourage more people to 
attempt the dangerous sea crossing and lead to 
more deaths. But the UK government seems to 
stand quite alone with their announcement that 
search and rescue operations are a “pulling factor”, 
encouraging economic migrants to come to Europe 
(Nelsen 2014). The British Refugee Council chief 
executive, Maurice Wren, opposes this, by stating 
that: “The British government seems oblivious to 
the fact that the world is in the grip of the greatest 
refugee crisis since the Second World War. People 
fleeing atrocities will not stop coming if we stop 
throwing them life-rings; boarding a rickety boat in 
Libya will remain a seemingly rational decision if 
you’re running for your life and your country is in 
flames. The only outcome of withdrawing help will 
be to witness more people needlessly and 
shamefully dying on Europe’s doorstep” (Quoted in: 
ECRE 2014). The announcement by the UK has 
however also intensified discussions on the 
responsibility to ensure search and rescue of 
migrants in the Mediterranean, and other related 
issues on tackling human trafficking, etc. 
 
Enhancing Legal Migration Routes to Europe 
 
In order to understand the relevance of this 
chapter, it is important to highlight that apart from 
resettlement, there are no other legal ways for 
asylum seekers to enter the EU territory to file a 
claim. Resettlement is defined by UNHCR as “the 
selection and transfer of refugees from a state in 
which they have sought protection to a third 
country that admits them – as refugees – with a 
permanent residence status”. Although 
resettlement is considered a very durable solution, 
it is also at the same time a limited option as the 
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numbers are quite low, for example in 2014, the 
EU collectively resettled approximately 7,500 
persons (European Resettlement Network 2015). 
UNHCR (2014c) is concerned that making legal 
departure from countries of origin more difficult 
will feed into the smuggling and trafficking 
networks, as they will become the only option for 
access to the EU's territory. To be able to make any 
real headway on the issue of sea crossings, a 
credible alternative must be offered to the people 
before they embarked on this dangerous journey. 
Legal channels will help to fight abuses and 
irregular migration. 
 
According to numerous NGOs, and also the UNHCR 
and ECRE, the most straightforward option is to 
establish Protected Entry Procedures (PEPs). This 
would allow an individual to approach the 
authorities of a potential host country outside its 
territory, in order to claim international protection 
and be granted an entry permit in case of a 
positive response to that claim (ECRE 2014). The 
Commission (2014b: 7) recognizes that PEPs “could 
complement resettlement, starting with a 
coordinated approach to humanitarian visas and 
common guidelines.” Only Bulgaria, The 
Netherlands and Spain have incorporated some 
form of PEPs in their national legislations. Austria 
and Denmark abrogated the PEPs with the 
argument that the administrative and economic 
burden on the single Member States was too high. 
Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Portugal authorise entry in exceptional cases and 
in an informal fashion. It has to be borne in mind 
that it is not easy to evaluate the practical 
implementation of PEPs as applicants are accessed 
from abroad. While PEPs present a risk of 
arbitrariness, they are are flexible and could be 
used in various situations, such as to allow the safe 
and legal entry of refugees and people in need of 
protection (ECRE 2014). In this regard, UNHCR has 
stressed that  PEPs and  humanitarian visas should 
be reconsidered as “potential means to ensure 
people at risk can be identified outside the EU, and 
granted visas by Member States on a voluntary 
basis, to facilitate their travel to safety in Europe” 
(Italian Council for Refugees 2014: 38f). 
 
The currently negotiated Directive on students, 
researchers and other groups could also make an 
important contribution with clear admission rules 
and status (European Commission 2013: 13). This 
is strongly supported by UNHCR, and the UNHCR 
(2014d) has called on Member States to do more 
to facilitate private sponsorship schemes and 
family reunification. 
 
The global commitment of the EU for resettlement 
and humanitarian admissions of refugees reached 
15,000 in 2014, which is a significant increase from 
4,930 in 2012. However, while the absolute 
numbers have increased, the number of Member 
States participating in the resettlement remains 
limited (European Commission, 2014d: 5). 
 
The Principle of Non-Refoulement and Push-Backs 
 
The Geneva Convention defines the principle of 
non-refoulement, which “(…) prohibits contracting 
states from expelling or returning (French, refouler) 
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion” (Pirjola 2009: 354). 
 
Unpopular cases like the “Cap Anamur” (2009) 
have led to a small change when it comes to 
refoulement, particularly in Italy. However, there 
are still cases, mainly in the Spanish enclaves Ceuta 
and Melilla as well as in Greece where local 
authorities had taken a harsh stance to push back 
irregular migration by deporting irregular migrants 
from the country without granting them the right 
to file an asylum claim. 
 
The case of “Cap Anamur” highlights the problems 
which may occur during a rescue at sea. In 2004, 
the German flagged vessel Cap Anamur rescued 37 
people who were in distress between Libya and 
Italy. When the vessel requested permission to 
dock in Sicily, it was denied. The captain and first 
officer of the vessel were detained and the vessel 
seized under charges of aiding irregular 
immigration. A lengthy trial went on for over three 
years and even though all defendants were 
eventually acquitted, the case demonstrated that 
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rescue at sea arising out of humanitarian reasons 
may still make one end up on the wrong side of the 
law. This case has served as a deterrent and a 
warning for seafarers against rescuing people in 
distress, since they might risk similar legal issues. 
In order to avoid crime by association, costly 
investigations and possible prosecutions, many 
seafarers turned a blind eye to boats with irregular 
migrants in distress, leaving them to  their fate at 
sea (Basaran 2014: 374). Rescue at sea becomes an 
operation that small fishing boats and even larger 
commercial vessels simply cannot afford to get 
involved. The “Cap Anamur” case highlights how 
national and international law, can be selectively 
undermined (targeting irregular migrants only) 
through a system of legal sanctions. Anti-
smuggling legislation can be used to sanction 
rescue, even though rescue is firmly anchored in 
national and international legislation (ibid. p.377). 
 
In October 2013, Spanish authorities decided to re-
install the razor wire on the Melilla fence and add 
“anti-climb” mesh to prevent irregular migration 
into Spanish territory. Push-backs are carried out 
also in these areas. An unpopular incident 
occurred in February 2014, when approximately 
300 persons near Ceuta tried to enter Spain. When 
the migrants tried to cross the sea, the Spanish 
Civil Guard started to fire into the air. When 
authorities realised that some migrants succeeded 
to enter the Spanish territory they began firing 
rubber bullets and teargas which led to the 
drowning of 15 persons. The Spanish Civil Guard’s 
reaction was considered unnecessary and 
excessive. The 23 migrants who managed to enter 
Spain were collectively expelled to Morocco in 
violation of the national legislation, and 
international and EU law. This action has been 
condemned by several NGOs and by Amnesty 
International as these persons were under Spanish 
control and jurisdiction as they had been 
apprehended by the Spanish Civil Guard officers 
(Italian Council for Refugees 2014: 96). 
 
Ceuta and Melilla are becoming large detention 
centres where migrants are obliged to remain 
during either the eviction proceedings or asylum-
seeking procedure. Asylum seekers are subjected 
to exceptional measures, for example the ban on 
freedom of movement, which is an unprecedented 
step backwards for the Spanish international 
protection regime. Despite the legal framework 
against this practice and criticisms by the European 
Ombudsman, the UNHCR and the Special 
Rapporteur on Racism and Xenophobia, this 
situation persists. This is pushing asylum seekers to 
withdraw their asylum application, while others 
put their lives at risk by trying to cross the Strait of 
Gibraltar (Italian Council for Refugees 2014: 97). 
 
The issue of push-backs has also been associated 
with Frontex and border guards of the respective 
countries. There were various reports showing that 
interceptions by border patrols took place in 
international waters (Demmelhuber 2011: 818). 
The boats were then escorted back to the state 
where they started their journey. This happened 
without any screening to check whether some of 
persons on board would fall under the ‘non-
refoulement rule’. Irregular migrants were then 
deported to countries considered as de facto safe 
third countries. This procedure is in breach of 
international and European law, since the 
respective authorities are obliged to check if each 
single migrant is in need of international 
protection. An important aspect of ensuring 
protection-sensitive border management is 
providing training to border guards and other 
authorities. Fundamental rights, refugee law and 
the international legal search and rescue regime in 
accordance with the Frontex Regulation should be 
the keystone of this training (Italian Council for 
Refugees 2014: 116). 
 
Cooperation with Third Countries 
 
Cooperation with countries of origin or of transit is 
a cornerstone of the EU's policy regarding irregular 
migration. The cooperation with third countries 
has also been referred to as an externalisation of 
borders since most assessments of the EU's 
external migration policies show that they are 
dominated by the EU Member States' interest in 
securing external borders and controlling 
immigration into EU territory (Wunderlich 2013). 
The partial externalisation of EU migration policy 
through ‘non-arrival measures’ enjoys strong 
support among EU decision makers. 
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Since 2005 the Global Approach to Migration and 
Mobility (GAMM) is the overarching framework of 
the EU external migration and asylum policy. 
GAMM defines how the EU should conduct its 
policy dialogue and operational cooperation with 
third countries in the area of migration and 
mobility and is embedded in the EU’s foreign policy 
framework, including development cooperation. 
The GAMM is implemented through several 
political instruments, such as:  
 
1. bilateral and regional policy dialogues and 
action plans,  
2. legal instruments: visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements,  
3. operational support and capacity-building 
through EU agencies such as Frontex and EASO 
(European Asylum Support Office) and technical 
assistance facilities (European Commission 2014a). 
 
In order to promote policy dialogue and 
operational cooperation with partner countries 
Mobility Partnerships (MPs) have been 
implemented. MPs bring together various 
bilateral/multilateral projects. So far, MPs have 
been concluded with seven countries: Moldova 
(2008), Cape Verde (2008), Georgia (2009), 
Armenia (2011), Morocco (2013), Azerbaijan (2013) 
and Tunisia (2014). Discussions on a MP have 
begun with Jordan in December 2013 (European 
Commission, 2014a). 
 
The EU adopted a “take it or leave it” approach 
during the negotiations of the MPs. There was 
little room for the third-country's government to 
influence the content of the MP. Nevertheless, the 
Council acknowledged that visa facilitation 
agreements are an important incentive for third 
countries to sign readmission agreements (Reslow 
2012: 398). However, there were also countries 
such as Senegal who refused to sign up to MPs as 
they see the EU's approach to migration as a 
cynical approach to extend border control further 
away from the EU by giving competences to third 
countries (ibid., p.403). 
 
Another policy of cooperation and partnership 
with third countries is addressed through Regional 
Protection Programmes (RPPs). The incentive of 
RPPs is that third countries shall adopt or amend 
their national asylum legislation, conforming to 
international standards, such as the Geneva 
Convention, and the enhancement of reception 
and admission standards (Italian Council for 
Refugees 2014: 58). Since 2011, the EU has been 
implementing RPPs for North African countries, 
focusing on Libya, Tunisia and Egypt (European 
Commission 2014a: 7). 
 
Due to the increasing number of organised crime 
groups which operate in countries of origin/transit 
to facilitate irregular migration to the EU, 'irregular 
migration' has been identified as one of the EU 
Crime Priorities under the EU Policy Cycle for 
Organized and Serious International Crime 2014-
2017. There is a need to obtain a better picture of 
the situation in neighbouring countries of transit, 
therefore the establishment of networks of Liaison 
Officers in Libya and Turkey dedicated to irregular 
migration is an important step (European 
Commission 2014c: 16f). 
 
Libya plays a key role in the EU’s cooperation with 
third countries because it is a major transit point 
into EU territory by sea and one of the main 
corridors for sub-Saharan African migration to 
Europe. Some estimates dating to the early 2000s 
claim that close to 80,000 migrants were reaching 
Southern Italy and Malta every year, with the 
majority starting their journey from the Libyan 
coast (Torresi 2013: 650). To understand the 
nature of the cooperation of the EU and its 
Member States (mainly Italy) and Libya one has to 
go back to the year 2008, when the “Treaty of 
Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation” was 
signed by Silvio Berlusconi and Colonel Gaddafi. 
Libya agreed to tighten controls over its territorial 
waters and accept the return of migrants who tried 
to cross the Mediterranean. This was the 
cornerstone of push-backs policy by the Berlusconi 
government. Irregular migrants were directly 
ferried back to Libya without assessment of 
refugee status. After criticism from UNHCR and 
Amnesty International this practice was suspended 
and after the fall of Colonel Gaddafi, the treaty was 
cancelled in February 2011. However, during 2012, 
the then Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
Terzi, announced that a new agreement had been 
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discussed and negotiated with the new Libyan 
government. In July 2013, Italian Prime Minister 
Letta met his Libyan counterpart in Rome to 
discuss further cooperation between the two 
countries, which was to include a continued 
partnership regarding migration issues (ibid. p.653). 
 
Since the fall of Colonel Gaddafi, the EU has 
supported Libya in the areas of migration, border 
management and international protection, in spite 
of the difficult security and political situation. In 
May 2013 the Council decided to provide further 
assistance towards the development of an 
integrated border management system in Libya 
which was established within the framework of the 
EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (European 
Commission 2014d). 
 
The effective use of EUROSUR was also an 
important cornerstone in cooperation with third 
countries. The EU has implemented projects to 
enable non-EU states to tap into the system. For 
instance, one of the EU funded projects in North 
Africa is the “Southern Mediterranean Border 
Surveillance Network”, which aims to increase the 
capacity of the authorities of the North African 
countries to tackle irregular migration and human 
trafficking by strengthening their border 
surveillance systems. Specifically, the programme 
aims to help Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia to set 
up technical systems that will allow them to inform 
each other and the EU Member States (in 
particular Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta and 
Spain) about “illegal or suspect activities” and to 
organise a coordinated response (Amnesty 
International 2014). 
 
The incorporation of security policies and Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation in EU foreign 
policy is aimed at creating a buffer zone. “(...) 
[C]ooperation in JHA provided a more stable 
ground for cooperation in Euro-Mediterranean 
affairs, in particular in the EU’s quest for extending 
its governance beyond its own borders and to 
establish a policy space that encompasses the 
actors, rules and practices that relate to the EU’s 
efforts to protect its citizens from a wide range of 
internal and external threats” (Demmelhuber 2011: 
816). However, this cooperation also acted as a 
tool to lay the ground for an ex-territorial border 
management strategy in order to tackle irregular 
migration in the countries of origin or transit right 
away – no matter whether these third countries 
share a common understanding of freedom, liberty, 
and security or whether these ‘non-arrival 
measures’ are in line with international and 
European law. Demmelhuber (2011: 819) was 
critical towards this policy and felt that “(...) the 
mandatory cooperation with authoritarian elites, 
in order to embark on ‘non-arrival measures’, has 
become a win-win-situation for the incumbent 
regimes to increase their grip on power.” 
 
Fight against Human Trafficking 
 
Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol (United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights 2000)  
defines trafficking in human beings as “the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring 
or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or 
use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the 
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a 
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of 
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.” 
Human trafficking is a complex transnational 
phenomenon which is rooted in poverty, lack of 
democratic structures, gender inequality and 
violence against women, conflict and post-conflict 
situations, lack of social integration, lack of 
employment opportunities and access to 
education, child labour and discrimination 
(European Commission 2012). This explains why 
the victims of human trafficking are often the most 
vulnerable in society – the poor, the minorities, 
women and children. The majority of reported 
victims from non-EU countries are from Nigeria, 
Vietnam, Ukraine, Russia and China (ibid.). 
 
The EU's approach towards the trafficking of 
human beings encompasses law enforcement, 
prevention and victim support. The EU recognises 
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trafficking in human beings as a violation of human 
rights: Article 5(3) of the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights prohibits trafficking in human 
beings. There are numerous treaties and legal 
documents which give the EU competence to act in 
response to human trafficking. For instance, the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU situates the 
EU’s power to act on trafficking in relation to its 
nature as a migratory phenomenon and a cross-
border crime. In addition, Directive 2004/81/EC 
gives the legal basis for granting residence permits 
to non-EU victims of trafficking (and smuggling) – 
however, only in cases where the victim 
cooperates with the authorities (European 
Migration Network 2014: 9). Another legal tool is 
Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and 
combating trafficking in human beings and 
protecting its victims. The Directive went into force 
in April 2013 and focuses on human rights and on 
the victims. It not only focuses on law enforcement 
but also aims to prevent crime and ensure that 
victims of trafficking are given an opportunity to 
recover and to reintegrate into society (European 
Commission 2012). 
 
Trafficking in human beings is also addressed in a 
number of external relations instruments, for 
example the annual progress reports on candidate 
and potential candidate countries, the roadmaps 
and action plans regarding visa liberalisation 
dialogues with third countries, the Country 
Strategy Papers and programmes of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. It is also addressed in 
bilateral Action Plans. Moreover, the Commission 
has appointed an EU Anti-trafficking Coordinator 
(EU ATC) who started work in March 2011 (ibid.). 
The EU ATC is to improve coordination and 
coherence amongst EU institutions, its agencies, 
Member States and international actors in 
implementing EU legislation and policy against 
trafficking in human beings. The EU ATC has a key 
role in coordinating the work of relevant JHA 
agencies in this area, such as EASO and Frontex 
(European Migration Network, 2014: 14). Frontex 
trains national border authorities in how to detect, 
identify and engage with victims of trafficking. 
Further, Frontex's role includes to detect other 
types of illegal cross-border activities, including 
drug trafficking. Most of the drugs seizures in the 
EU were in the Western Mediterranean area 
(Frontex 2014: 18). 
 
Another relevant point is the EU “Strategy towards 
the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 
2012-2016” which is also strongly supported by the 
EU ATC. The aim of this EU Strategy is to develop 
an EU-wide system for the collection and 
publication of data. The Commission liaises with 
national rapporteurs or equivalent mechanisms to 
ensure the collection of comparable and reliable 
data (Eurostat 2013: 16). 
 
The Commission currently funds a project that will 
develop guidelines to better identify victims of 
trafficking in human beings in 2014. It should help 
practitioners to identify victims, especially victims 
of human trafficking for sexual exploitation and 
labour exploitation, removal of organs and child 
victims of trafficking (European Commission 2012). 
 
As already mentioned, one of the aims of the Task 
Force Mediterranean is to strengthen the fight 
against trafficking and smuggling of human beings 
and criminal networks through a better inter-
agency cooperation and encouraging Member 
States to systematically provide relevant 
information to Europol (Italian Council for 
Refugees 2014: 32). 
 
However, it has to be highlighted that UNHCR 
(2014a: 4) stresses that the fight against trafficking 
should not only be rooted in criminal law but 
should follow a fundamental rights based 
approach in order to avoid the fragmentation of 
trafficking victims’ rights. Moreover, at first sight 
the distinction between acts of human trafficking 
and rescue appear to be obvious. Anti-trafficking 
laws demonstrate the difficulties of setting an 
impermeable boundary between humanitarian 
acts and criminal acts, which results in a dichotomy 
between protection and criminalization of 
humanitarian acts. This contrariness was also 
highlighted in the “Cap Anamur” case which was 
outlined in the chapter “The Principle of Non-
Refoulement and Push-Backs”. 
 
The European Commission proposes the full 
implementation of the Trafficking Directive, 
EUC Background Brief No. 13 
 
 13 
continuing the Anti-Trafficking Coordinator 
position, and a post 2016 strategy covering 
prevention, assistance, return and reintegration, 
and consideration for criminalisation of the use of 
services of victims of trafficking. 
 
Despite all the efforts of the EU to tackle trafficking 
in human beings and organised crime, the question 
remains how effective those policies are, especially 
in light of the recent events. At the end of 
2014/beginning 2015, three so called “ghost ships” 
were discovered in the Mediterranean within a 
few weeks. The ships originated from Turkey, were 
abandoned by the crew and left on autopilot on a 
collision course towards the Italian coast. Out of 
the roughly 1,500 people rescued by the Frontex 
operation “Triton”, almost all were Syrians. An 
Italian official said that the traffickers used cargo 
vessels at the end of their life, and then put 
hundreds of people on board, each of them paying 
up to $6,000 for the crossing, which is roughly 
three times the rate for a place on an inflatable 
dinghy departing from North Africa (Hooper 2015). 
This equates to a profit of around $2-3 million per 
ship, depending on the vessel's size. This new 
strategy of smuggling people into the EU highlights 
more starkly than before the people-smugglers’ 
response to the latest change of policy. “It is pure 
moral blackmail. Frontex and the Italian authorities 
can either take charge of the ship – or bear the 





Despite of the number of people saved due to 
rescue operations in the Mediterranean, it is 
evident that these policies have so far not 
succeeded in reducing the death toll and the 
constant flow of refugees into Europe. The death 
toll at European borders seems to be incessantly 
increasing. It has become obvious that saving lives 
at sea is not simply a question of enhancing rescue 
efforts, but requires the elimination of sanctions 
for rescue at sea, since sanctions counter the 
proper functioning of the international rescue 
regime. UNHCR calls for an effective search-and-
rescue system. This system should include 
arrangements for the disembarkation of those 
rescued at a safe place and an early identification 
of those in need of international protection, 
humane treatment and prevention of refoulement, 
as well as access to fair and efficient asylum 
procedures. 
 
Without question the EU has the right to embark 
on controls of its external borders. But the EU is 
obliged to conduct border controls without 
threatening fundamental elements of international 
law and European law (such as the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union). Some 
of the policies in place show that in trying to 
improve (border) security, freedom may have been 
compromised.  It speaks for itself that immigration 
and asylum are included with internal security 
matters and are not associated with the protection 
of fundamental rights as part of the same political 
approach. Some scholars argued that “Linking 
immigration with security, and separating it from 
the protection of rights, sends the wrong political 
message” (Sepi 2010: 80). Rescue of migrants at 
sea has to be separated from border security 
concerns. Intercepting boats with potential 
irregular migrants in international waters does not 
turn them automatically into illegal migrants due 
to circumstantial evidence. Tough security policies 
have not solved, just changed, and complicated 
the dynamics of irregular human movement. 
Resolving the tension between preventing arrivals 
and protecting migrants and refugees on their 
journeys is essential (Grant 2011: 141). Current 
deficit in EU policies show that there is a need to 
create a legal basis which offers protection to 
irregular migrants, in adherence to international 
law and EU law, e.g. the principle of non-
refoulement. More transparency is also required, 
in particular in the network of relations that the EU 
struck with third countries and the bilateral 
agreements signed between EU Member States 
and transit countries and countries of origin. 
 
The alleged lack of solidarity among EU Member 
States has also become a point of contention. For 
instance, Italian Prime Minister Renzi's call for the 
EU to address the migrant crisis by investing in 
border control agency Frontex and in the UN to 
intervene in Libya to manage the flows of refugees, 
remained unheard (Africa Research Bulletin: 2014). 
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The call to support the Italian Government in 
dealing with the high migration pressure due to 
Italy's geographic position has so far not yield any 
robust response from the EU. 
 
In conclusion, one can say that there is the need 
for more concerted action in the Mediterranean by 
the EU and its Member States. This has been 
highlighted again with the recent development of 
the abandoned cargo ships with migrants on board. 
To address this issue of dangerous crossings by sea, 
efforts to rescue people at sea and stepping up 
legal alternatives to dangerous voyages are 
required. UNHCR (2015) supports this strongly by 
stating: “Without safer ways for refugees to find 
safety in Europe, we won't be able to reduce the 
multiple risks and dangers posed by these 
movements at sea.” To increase resettlement in 
the EU would be one of possible legal ways. 
Another one, completely unexplored option, 
would be family reunification as a protection tool. 
UNHCR (2014b) promotes this strongly, stating 
that “field research has demonstrated that family 
reunification and presence of family members is a 
key driver to facilitate the successful integration of 
beneficiaries of international protection present in 
the EU.” However, with current sentiments against 
immigration and migrants in Europe, these 
measures may not be fully supported and 
comprehensive EU policies towards dealing with 
irregular migration and asylum seekers may still be 
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